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El autor y sus críticos

Answers to My Critics

MARIO CAIMI¹

1. Answer to Dennis Schulting

In his careful and sympathetic reading Prof. Schulting has found many occasions to formulate observations and questions. Some of them may be collected around related issues to be answered together.

1.1. The gap

In page 465 Schulting writes:

It thus seems that, for Caimi too, there is a *prima facie* gap between the unity of the representations of the Self and any objective unity of representations that refers to an object, that is, has objective validity. Or put differently, there doesn't seem to be any *identity* between self and object.

I agree with Schulting as he says: “Basically, I take Kant to argue in the Deduction that there is no gap between the transcendental unity of apperception which governs self-consciousness and the transcendental conditions for the objects of thought” (2018, pp. 131-143; see also 2013, p. 203: “it is [...] clear that there is no such gap”).

However, I did not mean that there is such a gap as Schulting attributes to me. Of course, in the unity of the representations in the “I think” there is already implied the form of an object in general. However, in the text of §15 and §16 there is not yet an explanation of the identity Schulting rightly points at, of unity of apperception and object in general; nor is there yet a complete proof of the legitimacy of the application of the categories to actual sensible objects.

There remains no more place for such a gap once the Deduction is entirely performed (that is, once the truth of the Copernican turn is

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demonstrated). But the factual order of Kant's argumentation has not yet reached this point. This is understandable, since not just Kant, but any author must display his argumentation step by step. Thus, Kant comes to define "object" according to the Copernican turn, only in §17.

1.2. The "novelty" of the concept of object in §17

Schulking disagrees with my statement that the concept of *object* appears as a novelty in §17. In page 467 he writes:

Caimi seems to be saying that we have moved from a discussion of *pure* subjectivity, the mere possession of the representations, in the preceding section of the Deduction (§16), to a wholly different discussion of objectivity in the current section (§17). This raises the question of how this sudden transition can be explained.

Schulking takes it as if I would say that in §17 a transition had taken place "from [merely] subjective to objective representations". This was not what I had meant. I just aimed at stating that from the standpoint of an exposition of the actual development of Kant's text a new concept is introduced. Certainly, from the standpoint of an autonomous reconstruction of the argument of the Deduction (a reconstruction that would not follow the actual text but offers an independent exposition of the theory) the concept of object is present since the very beginning of the Deduction (indeed, since the Foreword of B, as the Copernican Revolution was spoken of: B XVI). But the sense of my statement (as I wrote that the introduction of the concept of object takes place first in §17) is that before this paragraph the argument was focused on the synthesis and in the structure of understanding as a ground of the objectivity. The concept of object is first defined in §17 and it is there incorporated into the argument. This introduction prepares the conclusion that an actual object in its givenness receives the character of "object" from the synthesis of the understanding.

This might stand for an answer to what Schulking writes on pages 479-480, as he states: "what Kant says in the first paragraph of §17, the passage Caimi points to, is not so much a 'new thought' as what was already indicated, implicitly, in the argument of §16, namely thought's own object-directedness or objective validity". I mean that it was "implicitly" indicated in the whole subjective Deduction, devoted to the analysis of understanding (and also

implicitly indicated in many other former passages, from A XVI on). It is first made explicit on §17, where Kant begins to furnish a content to the formal structure of the object and explains the conditions of possibility of actual objects of knowledge.

1.3. The transition from §§16 to 17

About the argumentative structure of the Deduction, in page 468 Schulting writes:

The transition to the argument about objectivity should be seen as a logical step implied by the previous step in the argument and cannot signify a mere contrast with the previous step in the argument if indeed, as Caimi claims, the argument should be an ‘unfolding of the Principle of Apperception’.

In another text (2018, p. 135) he states that the transition from the “I think” to the thought of the object “is a ‘non ampliative’ one and can be carried out through a proper understanding of the constituents of apperception”.

The transition from §16 (statement of the Principle of apperception) to §17 (introduction of the concept of object) might be considered superfluous since the concept of object is implied in the Principle of Apperception (Baum, 2002, p. 108; see also 2019), but this implication is not yet made clear until the concept of *object* explicitly comes into the argument as a necessary part of it. Hitherto we have had the concept of objectivity (of objective validity). The introduction of the concept of object occurs as an addition needed for the complete development of the argument of the Deduction. To this, Schulting objects (in page 476, footnote): “Caimi’s notion of ‘Bereicherung’, or later on the notion of ‘synthetischer Vervollständigung’ (2017, p. 383) [quoting Caimi, 2017], remains vague”.

I take it that this notion was already made clear and precise by Kant in *Prolegomena* §4 AA IV, 275, as he explains the difference between analytic and synthetic method of exposition. According to the latter (i.e., to the synthetical method of exposition), the addition of a new element of the argumentation is not based upon a deductive-analytical procedure, but it is reached synthetically as we acknowledge a lack in an argument, which can be removed only by supposing a new condition of possibility which we were not hitherto aware of by means of the bare analysis of the concepts we were

working with. Through the synthetical method of exposition an addition of a new element is performed in the same way as, e.g., in the *Critic of Pure Reason* understanding endowed with spontaneity must be added to the exposition begun in the Aesthetic just because it is needed, since the mere analysis of receptivity cannot account for knowledge (Vaihinger, 1970, p. 326. The method of exposition can be synthetical as well as analytical; see *KrV*, A 12). In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant applies the synthetical method; thus, the introduction of the concept of object in §17 is a true novelty in the argumentation; a piece of argumentation that had not yet appeared. Its addition is not arbitrary though; it is justified because it is required by the synthetical method applied there. The introduction of this new concept becomes a need due to the necessary synthesis thought in the Principle of Apperception (and developed hitherto in paragraph 16) which grants objective validity also to sets of representations which have no actual object but are nonetheless representations actually contained in the mind (they are an actual phenomenal fact). Even those representations which form a dream² or a judgement of perception are submitted to the principle of apperception insofar as they are my representations. This does not mean that the content of the dream or of the judgment of perception itself has objective validity. Indeed, what is valid is just the remark that I do have those perceptions and dreams or that I formulate those judgments. On the other hand, only judgments whose unit is grounded (through the categorial synthesis) upon the unity of apperception (in contradistinction to judgments of perception) are valid as regards their content.

1.4. Relation between unity of consciousness and empirical set of representations

What I have explained in nr. 3 might furnish also an answer to Schulting's question on page 472 of his text:

it is not entirely clear to me how he sees the relation between the *analytic* unity of consciousness and the dispersed nature of any arbitrary set of discrete representations of which Kant speaks at B 133, or indeed whether he supports the idea that such a relation exists. [...] I'd like to hear more about what Caimi thinks about the relation, if he thinks it exists, between the *analytic* unity of consciousness

² This would be the case of what Wolff (according to Kant: *Prolegomena* AA IV 376) calls *somnium objective sumptum*: a dream in which "somniant res quaedam apparent, quae non sunt".

and any set of *merely* subjectively valid representations of which there may be an empirical consciousness.

What I think about this is, again: any set of representations presupposes the “I think”, otherwise these representations were nothing to me. The mere fact that they are my representations requires that they are submitted to the unity of consciousness, even if their connection is “merely subjectively valid” since it is built through an association performed by my empirical self.

Schulking puts forward an objection to this answer of mine, as he states on page 473: “But the problem here is that Caimi relates this to the discussion in the *Prolegomena*, where Kant still makes a distinction between judgements of perception, which are merely subjectively valid, and judgements of experience”. I must confess that I cannot understand why Schulking would wish to rule out this reference to *Prolegomena*, as he writes (page 473): “with Kant’s new definition of judgement introduced in the B-Deduction, the former distinction [of judgments of perception and judgments of experience] cannot simply be carried over to the discussion in the B-Deduction”. In my views, the example of *Critique of Pure Reason* §19, B 142 stating the difference between ‘If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight’ and the judgment ‘It, the body, is heavy’ is an analogous example of those of *Prolegomena*. I cannot find any reason to dismiss the treatment of judgments of perception on §§18 and 19. The “new definition of judgement” is introduced in the B-Deduction first in §19. It confirms that the connection of subject with predicate in an objectively valid judgment occurs through the unity of apperception, i.e., it is a categorial synthesis, just as the connection of subject and predicate in a judgment of experience in *Prolegomena*. This does not mean that subjective connections of representations (in judgments of perception) are wholly independent of the “I think”.

To be sure, the transition from §§ 16 to 17 cannot be identified with “the transition from subjective to objective representations” (as Schulking interprets my text in page 468 of his text)³ but rather with the synthetical transition from one moment of the synthetical method of exposition (the detection of an inherent flaw) to a further moment of the same method (the

³ See too page 468, where he misses “a *logical* transition, in the order of reasoning, from [...] a subjective connection of representations to an objectively valid set of representations that ‘purports to be about an object’”.

mending of the flaw through the addition of an external element). Thus, the discussion about a “putative gap” proves to be out of place in the present argument.

1.5. Logical synthetical step

Schulking seems to demand a “logical step implied by the previous step in the argument” (p. 468 of his text) to explain the transition from §§ 16 to 17. I agree insofar this logical step is conceived of as the structural frame of the method of exposition applied in the *Critique*: a first moment in which a flaw is detected by the analysis of understanding; a detection which leads to the second moment: the mending of the flaw through addition of an external element (the affection through outer objects). What is detected in this step of the exposition of the transcendental Deduction is the insufficiency of pure understanding to produce an object; this awareness leads to the gradual introduction of the concept of actual object in the argument of the Deduction; this procedure begins with the explanation of what should be understood by object. But I presume that Kant’s argument, when doing this, cannot be just formal-logical (as Schulking seems to presuppose);⁴ were it so, it would be possible to reach a priori cognitions just by analysis of concepts. Knowledge demands sensibility in addition to understanding.

1.6. Commentary on B 134

On page 469 of his paper, Schulking writes:

[T]he counterfactual that Kant mentions, and Caimi discusses (2014, p. 27), namely ‘I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious’ (B134), cannot be associated with ‘this “I” [...] fragmented in a plurality of acts of consciousness’, as Caimi seems to suggest (2014, p. 27), assuming that he means by ‘this “I”’, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ of the *Grundsatz* presented at the start of §16. Misleadingly, Kant himself of course uses the pronoun ‘I’ in this very passage at B 134. However, strictly speaking there wouldn’t be an ‘I’ if it were ‘fragmented in a plurality’ of discrete selves.

⁴ “[T]he necessary *and* sufficient requirement for knowledge can be seen to lie in the unity of consciousness which makes representations objectively valid and hence is the condition of the understanding itself as the faculty of knowledge” (Schulking, 2013, p. 205).

I suppose Kant's formulation is not at all misleading. He just prevents from a possible wrong interpretation of the principle of apperception such as the one Schulting describes in page 469, in section "Ad (1)". I daresay, Schultings takes as self-evident the presence of "I" in Kant's statement, which is not the case. Already Lichtenberg expressed the possibility of a plural formulation of the apperception through the wording "es denkt": "*Es denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt. Zu sagen cogito, ist schon zu viel, sobald man es durch Ich denke übersetzt. Das Ich anzunehmen, zu postulieren, ist praktisches Bedürfnis*" ["*It thinks, one should say, just as one says: it flashes. Saying cogito is already too much once translated by I think. To assume, to postulate the ego is a practical need*"].⁵ Kant's use of "I" in his counterfactual example has the function of preventing that multiplicity of subjects in the use of the principle. Only the impersonal formulation would give occasion to think of a plurality of representations which complies with the principle although not being synthesized in an identical consciousness. It is the presence of the pronoun "I" that

rules out the idea that the 'I think' is dispersed among representations that would not have a 'relation to the identity of the subject', for there is no more original representation 'I think' that would accompany these putative discrete, non-identical 'I think's and combine them into a unity,

as Schulting rightly writes on page 471 of his text.

1.7. Oneness of the synthesis of apperception

On page 474 Schulting writes:

What strikes me as a relevant remark of Caimi's in this context is that he says that 'the rule furnished by the concept *has a necessity of its own*' (emphasis added) and

⁵ Georg Christoph Lichtenberg in *Sudelbuch K*, Nr. 76. An analogous thought about the impersonal formulation of the principle of apperception without employing the "I" can be found in Fichte: "Ich kann [...] wohl sagen: es wird gedacht" ["I can [...] well say: it is thought"] (1800, p. 172). See too Alois Riehl (1924, p. 515, note): "[D]ie Vorstellung: Ich ist durch die Einheit des Bewußtseins hervorgebracht. Nur das Gesetz des Bewußtseinseinheit ist a priori" ["The representation 'I' is produced by the unity of consciousness. Only the law of the unity of consciousness is a priori"]. In our present times have treated the issue Karen Gloy (2002, pp. 134f.), Heinrich Klemme (1995, p. 195), and also Karl Ameriks (2004, p. 86). About the relation between "I" and oneness see Düsing (2020, pp. 36f.).

that this leads to an ‘independence of that synthetic representation with regard to contingent occurrences and the arbitrariness of subjective associations’ (2014, p. 37). This suggests that Caimi believes that there are two kinds of necessary synthesis at work, which reflect the transition between a *merely* subjective unity among one’s own representations to an objectively valid unity of representations that refers to an object.

This interpretation of my text would be possible only if we admit the former interpretation of the transition from §§ 16 to 17 as if it were a transition from subjective contingent syntheses to objective necessary syntheses. I have already declared (see nr. 3 and 4) that this is not what I meant. Thus, I do not believe that “there are two kinds of necessary synthesis at work”. The necessity at work in the synthesis based on a concept is the same one expressed in the principle of apperception. As the metaphysical deduction of B 105 as well as § 19 (B 140f.) of the Deduction have shown, the conceptual synthesis (by which an objectively valid judgment is possible) is grounded upon the principle of apperception and expresses it. In the referred passage I just tried to say that thanks to the necessity of this synthesis we can distinguish it from the non necessary, but contingent combination of thoughts performed by an empirical subject, although it could seem that the constraint operated by empirical perception and association when we perceive an object is something akin to necessity. Such constraint is not the same as the necessity of the synthesis. The objective necessity of this latter synthesis does not depend upon the said constraint (as empiricist philosophy would possibly suggest).⁶ Thus, “the rule furnished by the concept has a necessity of its own”, that is, it is *a priori* necessary, and it does not depend on experience.

2. Answer to Claudia Jáuregui

After a careful and insightful reading of the book we are discussing here, Prof. Dr. Jáuregui puts forward many observations and a single objection. This one is especially clearly formulated in section 3 of her text “Kant y la paradoja del sentido interno: algunas reflexiones acerca de la interpretación de Mario Caimi” (“Kant and the paradox of inner sense: some considerations on Mario

⁶ “unter allen Vorstellungen [ist] die Verbindung die einzige [...], die nicht durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjecte selbst verrichtet werden kann” [“of all representations *combination* is the only one which cannot be given through objects. [...] it cannot be executed save by the subject itself”] (*KrV*, § 15, B 130, Kemp Smith’s trans.).

Caimi's interpretation"). There she declares that in my commentary to sections 24 and 25 of the B Deduction I have explained self-affection merely as an internal relation of understanding and sensibility, neglecting the significance of self-affection for the cognition of the "I".

As for her, she understands self-affection as that which originates the apparition of the "I" as an appearance; that is, self-affection produces the appearance of an object that was not there before, and which differs from external appearances. Thus, self-affection should be interpreted, according to Prof. Jáuregui, as a condition of self cognition. This is certainly an adequate way of understanding self-affection; Prof. Jáuregui develops this interpretation exhaustively in her enlightening book on this subject (2008).

At the beginning of my treatment of the paradoxes of inner sense (page 89 of my book) I have explicitly stated that I did not intend to develop the problem of self cognition at that stage of the Deduction, since it is widely acknowledged that if we take the text of sections 24 and 25 as if it referred to the possibility of self-knowledge, it results in the said text lacking connection to the entire argument of the Deduction.

Researchers who have interpreted the said passages in this sense (namely, in the sense of an enquiry about self knowledge) agree in considering the text as a digression that breaks the continuity of the argument of the Deduction and does not fit in it. In the book about Kant's B Deduction I have quoted, in this sense, Paton, Carl, de Vleeschauwer.

In a fundamental work published soon after the edition of my text Henry Allison explains this with clarity: "Although the topics dealt with in these pages may be peripheral to the main concern of the Deduction, they are central to Kant's views on the nature and conditions of the self's awareness and cognition of itself" (Allison, 2015, p. 388). Prof. Jáuregui's observation concurs in the same line of interpretation.

As for me, I have tried to point out that *it is precisely due to this way of conceiving of* the text of §§24 and 25 that the thread of the argument is broken. I mean this conception is improper, for by adopting it we hasten to specify the concept of self affection in a way that belongs in the chapter of Paralogisms, instead of taking it in the more general way required by the Deduction. If we deal with the concept of self-affection (just insofar as it is treated in the passages we are now examining) in a more general way: namely,

as “a discussion of the particular case of applying understanding to pure sensibility”,⁷ the coherence and order of the argumentation are preserved.

I believe that a less specific but more general reading of the problem of self-affection in the sections 24 and 25 makes manifest the function the treatment of this problem has within the argument of the Deduction. This function is not to expose the nature of the self-knowledge of the “I”, nor is it to explain the appearing of the “I” as an appearance due to the affection an “I-in-itself” exerts upon inner sense. Rather, in the passages we are referring to Kant exposes just an aspect of the Principle of Apperception.

Thus, Prof. Jáuregui’s views of self-affection are not opposed to mine, but hers and mine are rather complementary interpretations. For the sake of the Deduction there is only a need for a general account of self-affection as application of understanding to sensibility (Düsing, 2020, p. 33, note 12). This general explanation can be specified (as Prof. Jáuregui does, both in her observations as well as in her book of 2008) and developed in a theory of the conditions of self-knowledge of the “I”. Such specification may be later on needed in other sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (namely in the chapter on the Paralogisms) where it has its proper place; but it is not needed for the argument of the Deduction.

3. Answer to Claudio La Rocca

To my reassurance, Claudio La Rocca, whom I admire for his works *Soggetto e Mondo* and *Esistenza e Giudizio* among other outstanding works of his, observes (page 439) that “other readings” of the B Deduction are also possible. I take it, that these “other readings” are made possible by the choice of different starting points which in turn cause the adoption of different but equally valid points of view. I suppose that some remarks and objections advanced by La Rocca arise from the choice of starting points that are other than my own in his reading of the Transcendental Deduction.

La Rocca’s observations may be gathered around the following main points: 1. Considerations about the method Kant employs in the Deduction (“The Method”); 2. the nature of Apperception and of the act of Apperception (“The Apperception” and “The operations of the transcendental Ego”); 3.

⁷ See also Klaus Düsing (2020, p. 33, note 12): “Self affection is but the spontaneous influence of understanding upon the previously passive given multiplicity of intuition”.

comparison of the structure of the Deduction with the argument offered by Kant in the *Methodenlehre* (“The Self and the Deduction”); 4. application of the categories to empirical objects (“Empty or too full?”). These four themes are intertwined and reinforce reciprocally. Thus, I must deal with them both separately and as a whole.

La Rocca’s discussion of the method is focused on Kant’s explanation of the method of philosophy in general. Instead, following Kant’s indication in *Prol.*, AA IV, 274f., I have assumed that the method of exposition⁸ in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is synthetic, although the actual procedure also embraces many instances of analysis of concepts. Synthetical method (better perhaps: synthetical procedure) adds to the analyzed concepts marks that are not implicated in them but are indispensable for the further progress of the argumentation. By “analytical method”, on the other hand, I mean (also according to the referred passage of *Prolegomena*) a method of exposition that starts from an undisputable fact and searches for the conditions of its possibility. In spite of referring to my statement about the operation of the method as “synthetic enrichment” (in his footnote nr. 3), La Rocca seems to take my statements about the method of the Deduction as an “analytical procedure”.

For his part, he seems to assume that the exposition of the Deduction was constructed as an argumentation seeking to explain the possibility of experience, this one being presupposed as an undisputable although unexplained fact: “the transcendental conditions make experience possible, the latter [...] is the basis of demonstration [...] of the transcendental conditions” (page 435). This is what in *Prolegomena* is referred to as analytical way of exposition.

This difference in approach to the procedure and exposition of the Deduction could serve as an explanation of the reason why I stated that at a certain point the concept of object is first introduced in the argument of the Deduction synthetically, as an added novelty, whereas La Rocca maintains that this concept was already present from the very beginning of the Deduction. There is, furthermore, another difference about the general

⁸ It may be worth noting that I mean the method of exposition rather than the method of Philosophy. That is why I have used the term “procedure” instead of “method” in the title of the corresponding section of the book, p. 11. La Rocca deals with the architectonical-systematic concept of the method of philosophy (2013).

conception of the task of explaining the Deduction: La Rocca offers a very clear explanation of the Deduction in general. To this purpose he has recourse to the exposition of the argument of the Deduction that can be found in the *Methodenlehre*: “I only wonder whether its argumentative structure might not [...] be the peculiar one theorised in general in the *Methodenlehre* for transcendental propositions, rather than a simple procedure of analysis and conceptual enrichment” (page 436). As for me, I intended to follow the text of the Deduction step by step, along its actual development. My purpose was to render readable all the sentences of a text that appeared to be nearly unintelligible. On account of this aim of mine I had to delay the treatment of the question of the relationship of pure concepts to empirical knowledge (a relation which La Rocca claims to be present from the beginning of the Deduction) (page 435). I take it that understanding this relation requires a previous demonstration of the Copernican Revolution of thought regarding the objects, a demonstration that has its place with the definition of “object” in §17. Therefore, I could not have had recourse to the *Methodenlehre* right from the start.

Some of La Rocca’s keen remarks concerning my interpretation of apperception seem to stem from a problem raised by Kant’s text B 137. At this stage I must acknowledge a heavy mistake of mine due to a wrong interpretation of a word employed by Kant in the said text. In p. 44 of my book, I wrote: “How the Principle of apperception becomes a Cognition”. This erroneous title introduces, in the book, a helpless attempt to explain Kant’s sentence of B 137: “Das erste reine Verstandeserkenntniß also, worauf sein ganzer übriger Gebrauch sich gründet, welches auch zugleich von allen Bedingungen der sinnlichen Anschauung ganz unabhängig ist, ist nun der Grundsatz der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der Apperception” [“The first pure knowledge of understanding, then, upon which all the rest of its employment is based, and which also at the same time is completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, is the principle of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception”] (Kemp Smith’s trans.).

Not just myself, but also many interpreters (de Vleeschauwer, 1976, III, p. 123; Allison, 2015, pp. 353-354; Schulting, 2013, p. 205; compare Carl,

1998, pp. 196f.) and most translators⁹ understand this sentence as it would mean that the Unity of Apperception were in fact a kind of knowledge. Now, it is impossible that Kant himself had meant it this way, since it is well known that knowledge, in its strict sense, requires sensibility, and, when explaining the sentence of B 137, Kant states that this “first knowledge” is a priori and “completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition”. The difficulty to overcome the seemingly obscure sense of this paragraph stems from the widely overlooked gender (*genus*) of the noun “Erkenntnis”, which in Kant’s text stands as neutrum. Now, the meaning of “Erkenntnis” as a neuter word is not knowledge / cognition, but the noun, in its neuter use, has a juridical meaning: verdict, decree. Thus, Kant means: that “the first decree of understanding” (a decree that is purely *a priori* and independent of all sensibility) is “the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception” (see Caimi 2018/2019). This wording changes our reading of the passage and of Apperception in general. I must admit that this amended interpretation of Kant’s statement is not the one I have offered in my book (where I mistakenly interpreted “Erkenntnis” as “knowledge”). I believe that this warning about this mistake of mine may furnish an adequate answer to La Rocca’s claim for a closer explanation of the “operations of the transcendental Ego” (page 437). These operations of the understanding may well be directed towards cognition, they are nevertheless one and all grounded on a fundamental action of understanding which is not a *cognition* but an *a priori condition* of knowledge. Certainly, synthetical cognitive operations of understanding “can only take place in time”; but Apperception “is completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition” (*KrV*, B 137). Though La Rocca is aware of the possibility of this interpretation, as he points out that the “a priori ‘knowledge’ that arises from them [that is, from the categories] has a completely *divergent* character from that of ‘normal’ cognitive propositions” (page 437). Nevertheless, he still maintains the cognitive, although not “normal” character of Apperception. Thus, he cannot help to admit what cannot be admitted, namely an “a priori knowledge” which in truth is properly an “a priori decree”. Thus, the distinction between “decree” and “act of knowing” furnishes an answer to the question proposed by La Rocca: “The question [...] of the nature of the operations of application of the categories

⁹ Paul Guyer and Allen Wood: “cognition” (Kant, 1998, p. 249); Kemp Smith: “knowledge” (Kant, 1929, p. 156); Manuela Pinto Dos Santos and Alexandre Fradique Morujão: “conhecimento” (Kant, 1997, p. 137); Tremesaygues and Pacaud: “connaissance” (Kant, 1950, p. 115).

that are performed by the transcendental Ego and that constitute it as such” (page 437). The actual occurrence of the unifying acts may well take place in time, as La Rocca maintains. But §21 of the Deduction is not yet concerned with this act, but with Apperception, that is with a spontaneous act previous to that of applying the categories. Certainly, the decree of understanding is the spontaneous act of setting the uppermost condition of all actual acts of synthetical knowledge.

The above remarks belong to the discussion of the said chapter of my book, since it is a chapter which contains the wrong translation of the neuter word “das Erkenntnis”. The here offered exposition and resolution of this problem of translation is grounded on a method of exposition (a procedure) that is not an analytical one (in the sense of the quoted passage of *Prolegomena*). It cannot be analytical, since the fundamental decree is absolutely spontaneous and cannot be based upon anything whatsoever, thus it cannot be based upon the fact of empirical cognition.

The interpretation of “das Erkenntnis” as a *decree* explains the need of synthetically incorporating to the argument of the Deduction the treatment of actual objects given in sensibility. This, I hope, may provide an answer to La Rocca’s observation in his section 5 (“Empty or too full? The existence of empirical objects”). There he writes: “I think this further step would not be considered indispensable for Kant” (page 440). In my view, the fact that there are actually given objects does not depend on the Principle of Apperception; neither is the Principle of Apperception derived from any real knowledge of actual objects. The Copernican Revolution refers to the meaning of “object” and to the possible knowledge of given objects, it does not refer to their givenness. I take it, that the bare assumption of given known objects (the realism of objectivity) is not compatible with the Copernican Turn based upon the “first decree” of the Unity of Apperception.

4. General remark to all three discussions

I hope to have offered possible answers or commentaries to the valuable observations of Jáuregui, Schulting and La Rocca. Again, these my answers to the subtle observations of my critics just show the possibility of coexistence of many different approaches to the Kantian text. This plurality of interpretations does not invalidate any of them, but rather allows a richer

understanding of the *Critique*. I am deeply grateful to all three commentators for their careful dealing with my own text and for their contribution to the exegesis of the Deduction.

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