Plotinus’ concept of ‘We’ and Its Relation to the Kantian Tradition

Resumen

Hailed as an innovative concept in antiquity, Plotinus’ concept of the ‘we’ occupies a nuanced and somewhat elusive systematic position. On the one hand, it locates itself in the realm of the soul rather than the intellect; at the same time, however, it manifests a self-conscious dimension typically ascribed to the intellect rather than the soul. This paper attempts to resolve this ambiguity by interpreting the ‘we’ as a potential of self-consciousness, which explains why the ‘we’ can become similar to, but not identical with, the actual self-consciousness of the intellect. The proposed definition not only brings clarity to the seemingly paradoxical formulations surrounding the ‘we’ in Plotinus’ philosophy but also sheds light on the allegories that Plotinus employs. Moreover, my analysis highlights the similarity between the Plotinian ‘we’ and the characterizations of the self within the Kantian tradition. Drawing on Cassirer’s dichotomy between concepts of substance and concepts of function, and Kant’s assertion that the ‘I think’ represents a potentiality rather than an actuality of self-consciousness, this study attempts to provide a conceptual bridge between the Plotinian and Kantian frameworks.