Sobre la respuesta de Carlos Moya al Argumento de la Suerte

Authors

  • Mirja Pérez de Calleja Universitat de València

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.5.1.12474

Abstract

On Carlos Moya's Reply to the Argument from Luck

 

Resumen: Esta nota crítica se centra en el argumento de Carlos Moya (2017, 168-70) a favor de la conclusión de que el Argumento de la Suerte representa en realidad un problema mayor para los compatibilistas que para los libertaristas. La Sección 1 introduce brevemente el Argumento de la Suerte. La Sección 2 discute la distinción de Moya entre dos concepciones de deliberación práctica, y propone una manera alternativa a la de Moya de entender la crítica al libertarismo que se basa en la condición de que cualquier decisión libre debe tener una explicación contrastiva. Finalmente, la Sección 3 resume la respuesta libertarista de Moya al Argumento de la Suerte, y sugiere un modelo alternativo de determinismo que Moya podría considerar para completar su argumento.

Palabras clave: libre albedrío, Argumento de la Suerte, libertarismo, compatibilismo, explicación contrastiva, determinismo.

 

Abstract: This review focuses on Carlos Moya’s (2017, 168-70) argument for the conclusion that the Argument from Luck actually represents a greater problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. Section 1 briefly introduces the Argument from Luck. Section 2 discusses Moya’s distinction between two conceptions of practical deliberation, and suggests a justification that Moya does not consider for the condition that any free decision must have a contrastive explanation. Finally, Section 3 summarizes Moya’s libertarian response to the Argument from Luck, and suggests an alternative model of determinism that Moya might consider to complete his argument.

Keywords: free will, Argument from Luck, libertarianism compatibilism, contrastive explanation, determinism.

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Published

2018-05-24

How to Cite

Pérez de Calleja, M. (2018). Sobre la respuesta de Carlos Moya al Argumento de la Suerte. Quaderns De Filosofia, 5(1), 91–99. https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.5.1.12474
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Issue

Vol. 5 No. 1 (2018)

Section

Book Symposium

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