¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?

Authors

  • Jorge Mittelmann Universidad de los Andes

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.1.2.4110

Abstract

This paper deals with a seeming contradiction that may seriously impair Aristotle’s definition of the soul in his De Anima. While this definiens has been widely regarded as providing a non-dualistic account of life-functions, grounded in a hylomorphic approach to living beings, Aristotle sticks to an instrumental language vis-à-vis the body, which he consistently refers to as a tool of the soul. It is argued that this philosophical way of talking should be taken at face value, without dismiss- ing it as a stylistic feature or a theoretical hangover from Aristotle’s Platonic days. By paying close attention to the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic reception of the “soul – boatman analogy”, the paper concludes that organic bodies may be considered as instrumental in nature, without this entailing commitment to further individual souls conceived as “users”.

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Published

2014-09-16

How to Cite

Mittelmann, J. (2014). ¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?. Quaderns De Filosofia, 1(2), 11–33. https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.1.2.4110
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