La refutación kantiana del idealismo y el realismo ingenuo reconsiderado
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.4.2.13963Abstract
En su célebre “Refutación del Idealismo”, Kant ofrece un argumento que pretende socavar al “idealismo problemático”, según el cual la existencia de “objetos en el espacio por fuera de nosotros es dudosa e indemostrable”. Los objetivos de este texto son: primero, evaluar la refutación kantiana del idealismo; segundo, mostrar que la conclusión de la refutación puede ser entendida de al menos dos maneras, una débil y una fuerte. Y, finalmente, sugerir cómo tanto la versión fuerte como la débil son compatibles con el idealismo trascendental de Kant, si éste se compromete con una versión del realismo ingenuo.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
-
Abstract2731
-
PDF (Español)634
Issue
Section
License
The authors who publish in this journal agree with the following terms:
- The authors retain their copyright and guarantee to the journal the right to be the first to publish the work and to license it under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of its authorship and the initial publication in this journal.
- Authors may separately establish additional agreements for non-exclusive distribution of the version of the work published in the journal (for example, placing it in an institutional repository or publishing it in a book), with acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are allowed and encouraged to disseminate their work electronically (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their own website) before and during the submission process, as this can lead to productive exchanges as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (see The Effect of Open Access).