The Authorisation of Theoretical Reason and Natural Ends in Kant
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.9.2.28126Abstract
This paper seeks to examine the problem of the rational justification for the principles and concepts of reason for theoretical knowledge, departing from Kant’s claims in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of pure reason. My aim is to introduce the problem and show how, in my view, Kant opens the path for a possible rational justification through the objectivity granted to the teleological judgment for the explanation of organized beings in the Critique of the power of judgment. I aim to show how Kant’s affirmations regarding the positive role of reason in theoretical cognition present an interpretative problem. This problem, I argue, requires a resolution which attends to the realistic or objective element demanded by the very idea of the properly theoretical aims of reason.
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