Kant and the Structure of Conceptual Representations: Universality, Characteristic Mark, Reflection, Discursiveness

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.9.2.28148

Keywords:

conceitos, universalidade, nota característica, discursividade.

Abstract

The present article explores the structure of conceptual representation in Kant's philosophy through the analysis of its various qualifications, namely universality, characteristic marks, reflectiveness, and discursiveness, as well as the understanding's operations that constitute it, namely the operations of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. This exploration is based on the text of the Logic organized by Jäsche and in comparison with Schulphilosophie. It is demonstrated how admitting conceptual representations as universal representations, that is, representations by common characteristic marks for various objects, is a natural description of conceptual representations. Meanwhile, as reflected representations of logical operations, they originate from the rules inherent in their application to particular cases, so that possessing a concept is also the ability to judge. In conclusion, it is argued that the possession of concepts is recognized to the extent that one is capable of judging. The link between concepts and judgments is inseparable, and the possession of concepts without the ability to judge is an indicator of historical knowledge, not rational knowledge.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Felipe Cardoso Silva, Universidade de São Paulo.

Doutorando em Filosofia pela Universidade de São Paulo. Bolsista CAPES.

References

Allison, H. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Yale University Press.

Baumgarten, A. G. (1963). Metaphysica. G. Olms.

École, J. (1990). La métaphysique de Christian Wolff. G. Olms

Kant, L. (1998). Lógica. Tradução de Guido Antônio de Almeida. Tempo Brasileiro.

Lebrun, G. (1982). L'aporétique de la chose en soi. Les Études Philosophiques, 2,199- 215. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20847894

Liedtke, Max. (1966). Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant. Archiv für Geschichte der  Philosophie, 48, 207-216. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph.1966.48.1-3.207

Longuenesse, B. (1998). Kant and the Capacity to Juge. Princeton University Press.

Meyer, M. (2018). Le paradoxe de l’objet chez Kant. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 284, 159-175. https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.284.0159

Miles, M. L. (1978). Logik und Metaphysik bei Kant: Zu Kants Lehre vom zwiefachen Gebrauch des Verstandes und der Vernunft. Vittorio Klostermann.

Vuillemin, J. (1961). Reflexionen über Kants Logik. Kant-Studien, 52, 310-335. https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1961.52.1-4.310

Wolff, Ch. (1983). Gesammelte Werke II, 1. Hildesheim: G. Olms.

Published

2024-12-20

How to Cite

Cardoso Silva, F. (2024). Kant and the Structure of Conceptual Representations: Universality, Characteristic Mark, Reflection, Discursiveness. Revista De Estudios Kantianos, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.9.2.28148
Metrics
Views/Downloads
  • Abstract
    18
  • PDF (Português )
    7

Issue

Section

Sección monográfica

Metrics