El activismo que no apreciamos: Su señoría Kent, mi madre es feminista y vota aunque no sepa que está oprimida
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.9.2.22953Abstract
The activism we don’t appreciate: Your Honor Kent, my mother is a feminist and votes even if she doesn’t know she’s oppressed
Resumen: Broncano mantiene que ocupar una situación de opresión no garantiza la lucidez necesaria para identificar la propia situación como injusta. Esta posición nos advierte que nos vamos a encontrar con casos de personas oprimidas que no tienen conocimiento sobre su situación de injusticia ni una actitud crítica hacia la misma. Lo que me interesa analizar en este comentario es cómo afecta esto a la agencia política de esas personas. La conclusión que quiero evitar es la siguiente: Cuando no escuchamos a alguien que está oprimida pero que no conoce su situación de opresión, no la estamos traicionando como agente política, no la estamos silenciando como posible activista. En este comentario propongo un análisis de las quejas que nos permite escapar de esa conclusión. Las quejas de muchas mujeres han de entenderse como acción política, una acción política que no está necesariamente acompañada de conocimiento sobre la injusticia que sufren. Una vez entendemos sus quejas como activismo, ya no podemos excluir a estas mujeres como sujetos políticos en la lucha contra el sexismo. Este análisis de las quejas nos lleva a concluir que estas mujeres sí que pueden ser traicionadas como agentes políticas, aunque no tengan conocimiento de su situación de injusticia. Las traicionamos cuando no entendemos sus quejas como resistencia.
Abstract: Broncano thinks that being oppressed does not guarantee knowing that you are oppressed. This view warns us that we are going to find people who are oppressed and who don’t have knowledge about their oppression nor a critical attitude towards their situation. What concerns me here is how this view affects the political agency of those people. The conclusion I want to avoid is as follows: When we don’t listen to someone who is oppressed but who doesn’t know their position as oppressed, we are not betraying them qua a political agent, we are not silencing them as a potential activist. I propose an analysis of complains that allows us to escape that conclusion. I propose that the complains expressed by many women should be understood as a political action, one that is not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of the injustice they are suffering. Once we see their complains as activism, we cannot exclude these women from the fight against sexism and deny their political agency. Under this analysis, women can be betrayed qua political agents even when they don’t have knowledge of their unjust situation. We betray them when we don’t understand their complains as resistance.
Palabras clave: Conocimiento, agencia política, activismo, resistencia, quejas.
Keywords: Knowledge, political agency, activism, resistance, complains.
Downloads
References
Dotson, K. 2012, “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression”, Frontiers, 33 (1): 24-47.
Gallego, M. 2020, Como vaya yo y lo encuentre. Feminismo andaluz y otras prendas que tú no veías, Libros.com
Haslanger, S. 2021, “Political Epistemology and Social Critique”, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 7: 23-65.
Haslanger, S. 2020, “Going On, Not in the Same Way”, en Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering, A. Burgess, H. Cappelen y D. Plunkett (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 230-60.
Haslanger, S. 2019, “Cognition as Social Skill”, Australasian Philosophy Review, 3 (1): 5-25.
Lorde, A. 1981, Sister Outsider.
Mason, R. 2011, “Two Kinds of Unknowing”, Hypatia, 26 (2): 294-307.
Medina, J. 2012, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 2001, “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options,” Economics and Philosophy, 17: 67-88.
Pohlhaus Jr., G. 2012, “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of ‘Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance’”, Hypatia, vol. 27, 4: 715-35.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
-
Abstract478
-
PDF (Español)273
Issue
Section
License
Works published in QUADERNS DE FILOSOFIA are under the licence Creative Commons Attribution-NonComercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International.
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
The authors authorize the publisher to archive the article into databases and indexes (such as EBSCO, DOAJ, ProQuest), and permit the publisher to apply DOI to the article.
Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).