“The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”

Authors

  • Daniel Dal Monte Temple University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.4.2.13939

Abstract

This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.

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Author Biography

Daniel Dal Monte, Temple University

I am a doctoral candidate in the Temple University philosophy department. I am currently working on a dissertation on interpretations of transcendental idealism and their possible implications for contemporary work on free will. 

Published

2019-10-27

How to Cite

Dal Monte, D. (2019). “The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”. Revista De Estudios Kantianos, 4(2), 476–507. https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.4.2.13939
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Section

Número monográfico: La actualidad de la Crítica de la razón pura. Parte Teórica

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