Is it feasible to employ the notion of "phenomenal consciousness" to explain consciousness in Kant's philosophy?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.9.2.28152

Keywords:

conciencia fenoménica, sensación, brecha explicativa, problema mente-cuerpo, configuración conceptual.

Abstract

This research is initiated around the question: can the contemporary concept of "phenomenal consciousness", as expounded in the works of Indregard (2018) and Longuenesse (2023), be a conceptual tool to explain certain uses of the term “consciousness” in Kant's thought, as highlighted by the secondary literature?

The answer will be that such a concept cannot be adequately integrated into the Kantian conceptual framework due to textual and systematic difficulties. The difficulties of integration can be traced back to the adoption of assumptions inherited from thinkers such as Nagel and Chalmers by Indregard and Longuenesse, in relation to issues such as the explanatory gap and the mind-body problem.

Thus, the proposal seeks to go beyond the critical review of secondary literature. It is more important to emphasize that the problematic adoption of these contemporary assumptions in the Kantian realm, in turn, could provide, from the reading of some arguments of Kant himself, some keys to rethink certain assumptions adopted by Indregard and Longuenesse, which are at the basis of the debate between reductionists and non-reductionists on consciousness in the framework of this problem.

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Author Biography

Javier Enrique Castillo Vallez, Universidad de Chile

Licenciado y Magíster en Filosofía por la Universidad de Chile. Doctorando en Filosofía por la misma casa de estudios. Becario ANID-PFCHA/Doctorado Nacional/Año 2022 — Folio 21221670. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4893-5425

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Published

2024-12-20

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Castillo Vallez, J. E. (2024). Is it feasible to employ the notion of "phenomenal consciousness" to explain consciousness in Kant’s philosophy?. Revista De Estudios Kantianos, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.7203/REK.9.2.28152
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Vol. 9 No. 2 (2024): Revista de Estudios Kantianos

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